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Abstract 
This paper examines experimentally the reputation building role of disclosure in an investment / 
trust game. It provides experimental evidence in support of sequential equilibrium behavior in a 
finitely repeated investment / trust game where information asymmetry raises the possibility of 
voluntary disclosure. I define two regimes, namely disclosure regime and no-disclosure regime 
and it is only in the disclosure regime that such disclosure of private information is a possibility. 
I compare investment levels across two regimes and find the startling result that investment is 
lower in disclosure regime. I find that this lower investment is attributable to the fact that the 
prior probability with which an investor in the disclosure regime believes that a manager is 
trustworthy is significantly lower than the prior probability with which an investor in the no-
disclosure regime believes that a manager is trustworthy. I introduce a two-stage experimental 
design to homogenize prior beliefs about managers’ trustworthiness and find that after such 
homogenization, investment is higher in disclosure. 
 
Keywords: Disclosure, Reputation, Investment, Trust. 
JEL codes: C73, C92, D82, M40. 
Data Availability: Contact the author. 
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1. Introduction 
Kenneth Arrow argued that trust is the lubricant of an economy (Arrow (1974)). The importance 
of trust in our economy and society can hardly be over-emphasized. Attempts to provide 
economic theory and related tests regarding the role of trust as a lubricant are in their infancy. 
Underpinnings for deeper aspects of how trust can relate to the vast set of economic institutions 
that exist in complex economic environments are starting to be explored in laboratory and 
archival studies of record keeping (Basu and Waymire (2006) and Basu, Dickhaut, Hecht, Towry 
and Waymire (2009)). This paper focuses on voluntary disclosure and examines experimentally 
how the opportunity to make voluntary disclosures enhances the building of trust and 
trustworthiness to facilitate institutions for exchange and investment in complex economic 
settings where there is separation of ownership and control of key economic resources.  
 
The setting derives from the investment game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995)) while 
incorporating reputation building as discussed in Camerer and Weigelt (1988). In this setting, the 
investor is endowed with some wealth and chooses how much to invest in a manager. The 
manager then chooses whether to keep the investment and its earned profit or return some 
dividend to the investor. The magnitude of the profit depends on the state of nature. The manager 
always learns the state of nature but the investor may or may not depending upon the regime and 
upon the manager’s decision on whether to disclose voluntarily. There are two regimes, namely 
disclosure regime and no-disclosure regime. It is only in the disclosure regime that the manager 
has the option to truthfully disclose the state of nature to the investor. 
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This paper provides experimental evidence in support of sequential equilibrium play in the above 
setting. Camerer and Weigelt (1988) argue that sequential “equilibria which rationalize 
reputation-building are often so complicated that it is reasonable to ask whether people actually 
play sequential equilibria in naturally-occurring games.” While sequential equilibrium theory of 
reputation building is complicated in and of itself, introducing an additional layer of complexity 
in the form of asymmetric information and disclosure possibilities raises the question of whether 
people actually play sequential equilibrium in such a setting. The assumptions underlying the 
theory are hard to verify in naturally occurring settings and therefore this paper tests the theory in 
a laboratory setting. 
 
This paper also tests the theoretical prediction that investment is higher in disclosure regime 
compared to no-disclosure regime. In a setting with two types of managers – trustworthy and 
rational, choosing to disclose voluntarily and choosing to pay a fair dividend are acts of the 
trustworthy manager that the rational manager will mimic to receive additional future 
investments. Theoretically, in a finitely repeated game where disclosure of private information is 
a possibility (disclosure regime), such mimicry will start with probability 1, and the investor will 
also invest with probability 1; that is, the game will start with pure strategic play. However, in 
later periods, mixed-strategy play will start in that the mimicry will switch to occurring with a 
probability strictly less than 1 to support managerial efforts at reputation building for 
trustworthiness. This switch will ensure that an investor’s prior / ex ante belief about a manager’s 
trustworthiness is updated upward to a point on the threshold at which the investor invests with a 
probability strictly less than 1. 
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In contrast, in a finitely repeated game where disclosure of private information is not a 
possibility (no-disclosure regime), a rational manager will start with paying dividends consistent 
with the worst possible state of nature. Lack of ex post verifiability of the state of nature implies 
that she is able to get away with pretending that the worst possible state of nature has occurred; 
however, this leads to a downward revision of an investor’s ex ante belief about a manager’s 
trustworthiness. This downward revision ensures that the mixed-strategy play and the 
concomitant lower probability of investment will occur sooner in a game where disclosure is not 
a possibility. These differences in the way managerial reputation building for trust occurs in an 
economy with disclosure as compared to one without imply that while both economies start with 
comparable levels of investment, in later periods, investment will be higher in economies with 
disclosure. Higher investment in later periods in economies with disclosure will translate into 
higher total investment in such economies. 
 
The hypothesis of higher investment in disclosure regime predicates on equality of prior beliefs 
across the two regimes. That is, the prior probability with which an investor in the disclosure 
regime believes that a manager is trustworthy should be equal to the prior probability with which 
an investor in the no-disclosure regime believes that a manager is trustworthy. In drawing subject 
samples from the same population, one would not expect the prior beliefs across the disclosure 
and no-disclosure conditions to be different. However, one very intriguing finding in this paper is 
that the prior belief in disclosure condition turns out to be lower than the prior belief in no-
disclosure condition. This necessitated the homogenization of prior beliefs across the two 
conditions before one could test the prediction of higher investment in economies with 
disclosure. 
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The homogenization of prior beliefs across conditions was achieved via introduction of a two-
stage experimental design. The first stage called ‘screening round’ enabled categorization of 
subjects as trustworthy and untrustworthy. Then a pre-determined proportion of trustworthy and 
untrustworthy types were selected to proceed to the second stage called the ‘main round’. This 
proportion was announced to the subjects that proceeded to the main round and provided them an 
anchor point to form their prior beliefs. The main round comprised either of the disclosure 
regime or the no-disclosure regime. The screening round while enabling test of the higher 
investment in disclosure hypothesis is also a methodological contribution. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the experiment design and 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the experimental procedures and analyzes the data from 
disclosure and no-disclosure regimes. Section 4 introduces the screening round, whereas section 
5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Experiment Design and Hypotheses 
I will define two regimes, namely, a disclosure regime and a no-disclosure regime. Truthful 
disclosure of private information is a possibility only in the former regime. Both regimes derive 
from the investment game of Berg et al. (1995). 
 
2.1 Disclosure Regime – There are two players: a sender/investor and a receiver/manager 
(hereinafter referred to as investor and manager, respectively). Nature moves first and selects the 
manager’s type as either trustworthy or untrustworthy (to be defined momentarily). The manager 
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knows her type, but the investor does not. The game then proceeds through three periods, during 
each of which the investor and the manager make a sequence of choices. In what follows, the 
subscript t (t = 1, 2, 3) will be used to denote a period. The manager chooses whether to disclose 
private information she will learn in the course of the game. Note that the manager is not privy to 
the private information at the time she makes the choice of whether to disclose it—it is 
information she will learn in the course of the game. It is as if the manager is making a choice of 
the accounting system: the manager could choose an accounting system that will generate 
information that both the investor and the manager will learn (by choosing to disclose), or 
alternatively, the manager could choose an accounting system that will generate information only 
the manager will learn (by choosing not to disclose). 
 
The investor sees the manager’s disclosure decision, is endowed with ten units of wealth, and 
chooses how many of the ten units to send to the manager (denoted by mt). The manager sees mt 
and receives tmt. The state of nature or multiplier (denoted by λ) is stochastic in that it is equally 
likely to be 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. The manager decides how much of the multiplied amount (tmt) to 
return to the investor (denoted by kt) and how much to keep for herself (tmt - kt). The investor 
receives kt and learns λt only if the manager had earlier chosen to disclose her private 
information; that is, if the manager had chosen an accounting system that generates information 
both the investor and the manager learn, then the investor learns λt. Otherwise, if the manager 
had chosen an accounting system that generates information only the manager learns, then the 
investor does not learn λt. In this sense, λt is the manager’s private information – she always 
learns the realized value of λt, but the investor’s knowledge of λt is dependent on the manager’s 
choice of the accounting system. The timeline for this game is described in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 – Timeline of the disclosure regime. 
 
A trustworthy manager is defined as one that always chooses to disclose and always chooses to 
return half of what she receives. An untrustworthy manager is defined as a manager that is not 
trustworthy. The multiplied amount (tmt) may be thought of as the gross income of the firm 
comprising the investor and the manager, and the amount sent back by the manager (kt) may be 
thought of as the dividend the manager pays to the investor. Risk neutrality, additively separable 
utility, and zero discounting rate are assumed. 
 
2.2 Equilibrium in the Disclosure Regime – In equilibrium, the investor plays a threshold 
strategy and chooses to invest all her endowment of ten units of wealth if her belief about the 
manager’s trustworthiness is above the threshold depicted in Figure 2. If her belief is below the 
threshold, she chooses to invest nothing.  
Nature 
chooses the 
manager’s 
type to be 
trustworthy or 
untrustworthy. 
The manager 
chooses 
whether to 
disclose private 
information she 
will learn in the 
course of the 
game. 
The investor 
sees the 
manager’s 
disclosure 
decision, is 
endowed with 
ten units of 
wealth and 
chooses to 
invest mt 
{0,1,..,10}. 
 
The manager 
sees the 
investment mt, 
receives tmt 
where  
t{1,2,3,4,5}, 
chooses to return 
kt {0,1,..,tmt } 
and keeps the 
residual tmt - kt. 
 
The investor 
receives kt and 
learns t if the 
manager had 
earlier chosen to 
disclose her 
private 
information. 
Repeat for three periods 
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Figure 2 – Threshold. 
 
For t < 3, the untrustworthy manager mimics the trustworthy type in period t if the investor’s 
period t belief is above the threshold at which she will invest in period t + 1. That is, the 
untrustworthy manager plays a pure strategy of mimicking the trustworthy type with probability 
1. However, if the investor’s period t belief is below the threshold at which she will invest in 
period t + 1, then the untrustworthy manager plays a mixed strategy. She mimics the trustworthy 
type with some positive probability strictly less than 1. The choice of the probability is such that 
the investor’s updated period t + 1 belief about the manager’s trustworthiness is exactly on the 
threshold.  
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If the investor’s period t belief is exactly equal to the threshold for period t, then the investor is 
indifferent about how much she chooses to invest. She plays a mixed strategy and chooses to 
invest a nonzero amount with some positive probability strictly less than 1. The choice of the 
probability is such that it makes the untrustworthy manager indifferent between mimicking the 
trustworthy type in period t – 1 and not mimicking the trustworthy type in period t – 1. In period 
3, the untrustworthy manager chooses to disclose if she had chosen k2 = λ2 m2/2 and then chooses 
k3 = 0. 
 
Hypothesis 1. The investor and the manager follow the sequential equilibrium strategies in the 
disclosure regime. An alternative hypothesis is that they follow the sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium strategies in which case there will be no investment and no return in any of the 
periods. 
 
2.3 No-disclosure Regime – Now consider the same game with the following modification: the 
investor never learns λt; that is, the manager does not have any means available to communicate 
her private information to the investor, even if she wishes to share this information. A 
trustworthy manager is defined as one that always chooses kt = tmt/2. This is a setting in which 
there is a firm comprising an investor and a manager and a gross income of λtmt,, but there is no 
accounting system available. A dividend of kt can still be paid, but the income λtmt cannot be 
reported. The modified timeline is described in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 – Timeline of the no-disclosure regime. 
 
2.4 Equilibrium in the No-disclosure Regime – In equilibrium1, the investor plays a threshold 
strategy as in the disclosure regime and chooses to invest all of her endowment of 10 units of 
wealth if her belief about the manager’s trustworthiness is above the threshold depicted in figure 
2. If her belief is below the threshold, she chooses to invest nothing.  
  
For t < 3, if the investor’s period t belief is such that her updated period t + 1 belief will be above 
the threshold at which she will invest in period t + 1, then the untrustworthy manager plays a 
pure strategy of returning the minimum amount consistent with her being the trustworthy type. 
For instance, if m1 = 10 and λ1 = 4, then the untrustworthy manager returns k1 = 5. Regardless of 
what λt obtains, the untrustworthy manager will return kt = mt/2 as long as the investor’s updated 
period t + 1 belief will be above the threshold at which she will invest in period t + 1. The 
untrustworthy manager is able to return the minimum amount consistent with her being the 
trustworthy type because unlike in the disclosure regime, the investor never learns λt. Further, 
                                                 
1
 For a derivation of the equilibrium, see Lunawat (2011a) and (2011b). 
Repeat for three periods 
Nature chooses the 
manager’s type to be 
trustworthy or 
untrustworthy. 
The investor is 
endowed with ten 
units of wealth and 
chooses to invest 
mt {0,1,..,10}. 
 
The manager sees the 
investment mt, receives 
tmt where t{1,2,3,4,5}, 
chooses to return kt 
{0,1,..,tmt }, and keeps 
the residual tmt - kt. 
 
 
The investor 
receives kt but 
never learns t. 
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since the investor knows that the untrustworthy manager returns kt = mt / 2, she revises her period 
t + 1 belief downwards.  
 
For t < 3, if the investor’s period t belief is such that untrustworthy manager’s returning the 
lowest amount consistent with her being the trustworthy type will lead to the investor’s updated 
period t + 1 belief to be below the threshold at which she will invest in period t + 1, then the 
untrustworthy manager plays a mixed strategy. She returns a non-zero amount with some 
positive probability strictly less than 1. The choice of the probability is such that the investor’s 
updated period t + 1 belief about the manager’s trustworthiness is exactly on the threshold.  
 
If the investor’s period t belief is exactly equal to the threshold for period t, then the investor is 
indifferent about how much she chooses to invest. She plays a mixed strategy and chooses to 
invest a non-zero amount with some positive probability strictly less than 1. The choice of the 
probability is such that it makes the untrustworthy manager indifferent about how much she 
chooses to return. In period 3, the untrustworthy manager chooses k3 = 0. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The investor and the manager follow the sequential equilibrium strategies in the 
no-disclosure regime. An alternative hypothesis is that they follow the sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium strategies in which case there will be no investment and no return in any of the 
periods. 
 
2.5 Investment in the Disclosure and No-disclosure Regimes – In the no-disclosure regime, if 
the investor’s belief about the manager’s trustworthiness is sufficiently high, an untrustworthy 
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manager can get away with paying a very low dividend. For example, if the investor invests 8 
units of wealth and a multiplier of 4 obtains, then the manager receives 32 units of wealth. 
However, the manager can pay a dividend of only 4 units of wealth and thereby convey to the 
investor that a multiplier of 1 obtained. Because the multiplier that obtains in not verifiable by 
the investor, the manager can hide behind a low multiplier. This implies that when the investor 
sees a dividend that conveys the occurrence of the lowest possible multiplier, she updates her 
beliefs about manager’s trustworthiness in such a way that her posterior belief is lower than her 
prior belief. Such downward revision of the investor’s beliefs in the no-disclosure regime implies 
that if the game starts in both regimes with the same prior probability, then mixed-strategy play 
will begin at least as soon in the no-disclosure regime as in the disclosure regime. Under very 
mild conditions, it can be shown that mixed-strategy play will begin sooner in the no-disclosure 
regime than in the disclosure regime. In this sense, the disclosure regime provides for additional 
reputation-building opportunities. Because the probability of investment in a period of pure 
strategy play is higher than the probability of investment in a period of mixed-strategy play, 
more pure strategy play in a disclosure regime will translate into higher total investment (m1 + 
m2 + m3) in a disclosure regime.
2
 
 
Hypothesis 3. Total investment (m1 + m2 + m3) in the disclosure regime is higher than total 
investment in the no-disclosure regime.  
 
2.6 Experimental Procedures – The experiment was programmed and conducted with the 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The experimental sessions were run at the Center for 
                                                 
2
 For a formal derivation of the proof, refer to Lunawat (2011a) and (2011b). 
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Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organizations (CIRANO) in Montreal, Quebec, 
Canada. 
 
Subjects were assigned the role of an investor or a manager. Roles remained unchanged 
throughout the session. One investor was grouped with one manager, and the subjects in the 
group played against each other for a set comprising three periods. At the end of a set, each 
subject was grouped with some other subject. No two subjects were grouped twice (perfect 
stranger matching). The roles and the game were explained to the subjects using neutral 
terminology (e.g. A-player for investor and B-player for manager). 
 
In the disclosure regime, the computer prompted the manager to decide whether she would like 
to share with the investor the knowledge of the multiplied amount the manager would receive. 
Then, the investor saw the disclosure decision made by the manager. Note that the no-disclosure 
regime did not require this stage of the manager’s disclosure decision. 
 
The investor was endowed with ten units of experimental currency, called lira. She decided how 
much of her endowment to send to the manager. The amount sent by the investor was multiplied 
before the manager received it. The multiplier was equally likely to be 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. The 
manager decided on how much to keep and how much to send back to the investor. At the end of 
every period, the subjects saw their payoffs and relevant information on their respective 
computer screens. At the end of the experimental session, each subject’s total payoff was 
converted to Canadian dollars using a preannounced exchange rate. 
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An experimenter read the instructions (similar to the instructions in Appendix A) aloud to the 
subjects, while the subjects followed along on their own copies of the instructions. After the 
instructions were read, subjects were asked to answer questions about the experiment. The 
questions appeared on their computer screens, and they were paid 50 cents for every correct 
answer. The computerized game started after this quiz. The CIRANO Research Institute in 
Montreal recruited the subjects. The subject pool at CIRANO draws primarily from students 
(graduate and undergraduate), although it also includes some nonstudents in Montreal. 
 
3. Evidence on the Sequential Equilibrium Hypotheses 
I ran two sessions of the disclosure regime. Sixteen subjects participated in the first session, and 
22 subjects participated in the second session. Of the 16 subjects in the first session, 8 were 
assigned to the role of an investor and 8 to the role of a manager. Perfect stranger matching of 
investors and managers implied that there were eight sets of three periods each. This session, 
therefore, yielded 64 (8 sets × 8 investor-manager dyads) observations. Similarly, the second 
session with 22 subjects yielded 121 (11 sets × 11 investor-manager dyads) observations. Sixty-
four observations from the first session and 121 observations from the second session gave a 
total of 185 observations. 
 
I ran two sessions of the no-disclosure regime. Sixteen subjects participated in the first session, 
and 24 subjects participated in the second session. As with the sessions on disclosure regime, 
half of the subjects in each session were assigned the role of an investor and the other half were 
assigned the role of a manager. Perfect stranger matching was implemented. Therefore, the first 
session with 16 subjects yielded 64 (8 sets × 8 investor-manager dyads) observations and the 
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second session with 24 subjects yielded 144 (12 sets × 12 investor-manager dyads) observations. 
Sixty-four observations from the first session and 144 observations from the second session gave 
a total number of 208 observations. Descriptive statistics on investment and on average 
proportion returned in both the regimes / experimental conditions are summarized in Tables 1A 
and 1B respectively. 
 
Amount Invested by Investor  Proportion Returned by Manager 
 Disclosure Period 1 Period 2 Period 3  Disclosure Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Mean 4.79 4.90 4.12  Mean 0.39 0.35 0.16 
Median 4 4 3  Median 0.42 0.4 0 
Std Dev 3.66 3.80 3.77  Std Dev 0.22 0.2 0.22 
Min 0 0 0  Min 0 0 0 
Max 10 10 10  Max 1 1 1 
No-
disclosure 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
 No-
disclosure 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Mean 6.58 6.26 5.59  Mean 0.43 0.4 0.3 
Median 7 6.5 6  Median 0.44 0.45 0.35 
Std Dev 2.82 3.12 3.62  Std Dev 0.24 0.21 0.24 
Min 0 0 0  Min 0 0 0 
Max 10 10 10  Max 1 1 1 
    
     
Table 1A – Summary statistics on investment 
in disclosure and no-disclosure conditions 
Table 1B – Summary statistics on 
proportion returned in disclosure and no-
disclosure conditions 
 
   
3.1 Sequential Equilibrium in the Disclosure Regime – The use of threshold strategy by the 
investor will show up in ‘zero’ investments and ‘maximum’ investments, that is, investments of 
0 or 10. In moving from the model to data, it is expected that the threshold strategy will show up 
in ‘low’ investments and ‘high’ investments instead of ‘all or zero’ investments. Defining ‘low’ 
investment as investment of 0 – 3 liras and ‘high’ investment as investment of 7 – 10 liras, 
  
17 
75.14%, 77.29% and 84.32% of investments in periods 1, 2 and 3 respectively are in the category 
of ‘high or low’ investments (Figure 4). 
   
Figure 4 – Investment strategy in disclosure regime 
 
In period 1, the average disclosure is 81.33% (135 / 166). After seeing the manager’s disclosure 
decision, the investor updates her belief about the manager’s trustworthiness. The manager’s 
overall return probability (including trustworthy and untrustworthy managers) in period 1 is 
0.6641. This overall return probability is estimated from data (Table 2). In estimating the overall 
return probabilities, instances where a manager returned more than half of what she received 
have been included with those where she returned half and instances where a manager returned 
less than half have been included with those where she returned nothing
3
. Since the overall return 
probability is less than 1, it must be that mixed strategy play by an untrustworthy manager begins 
in period 1.  
 
 Observed return frequency, from data Observed return frequency, excluding set 1 
                                                 
3
 In the experiment, a manager was allowed to return only in whole liras. This led to instances where a manager 
could not return to an investor exactly half of what she received. Consequently, in moving from the model to the 
data, the cutoff of half or more was replaced by a cutoff of 0.4 or more. 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
1
2
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Investment Strategy 
Invest high or low Other
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Period 1 
0.6454 
(91 / 141) 
0.6641* 
(85 / 128) 
Period 2 
0.7143 
(55 / 77) 
0.6944 
(50 / 72) 
Period 3 
0.34 
(17 / 50) 
0.3478 
(16 / 46) 
 
Table 2 – Return probabilities 
 
 
 
 
Now, the investor sees the manager’s return for period 1 and her disclosure decision for period 2. 
After seeing these, she updates her belief about the manager’s trustworthiness. Since mixed 
strategy play by the untrustworthy manager has begun in period 1, it must be that the investor’s 
updated or posterior belief about the manager’s type is exactly equal to the threshold for period 
2. The threshold for period 2 is 0.4444 (Figure 2). Using the overall return probability for period 
1, the threshold for period 2 and the Bayesian updating formula, one can infer the prior 
probability at the beginning of period 1. This inferred prior probability is 0.2951. 
 
The model predicts that disclosure in periods 2 and 3 will respectively follow return in periods 1 
and 2. That is, if the manager returns half or more of what she receives in period 1, then with 
probability 1 she will disclose in period 2 and similarly if she returns half or more of what she 
receives in period 2, then with probability 1 she will disclose in period 3. The actual disclosure 
probability (estimated from data) in periods 2 and 3 is 0.8471 and 0.98 respectively (Table 3). 
The predicted probability of 1.0 is in the 99% confidence interval for period 3 while it is not in 
the 99% confidence interval for period 2. 
 
Prior probability, inferred from threshold for period 2 and (*) = 0.2951 
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 Predicted Actual 
Excluding 
set 1 
Confidence 
Interval, 99% 
Average disclosure in 
period 2 given return in  
period 1
4
 
1.0 
0.8571 
(78 / 91) 
0.8471 
(72 / 85) 
0.7436, 0.9506 
Average disclosure in 
period 3 given return in  
period 2
5
 
1.0 
0.9636 
(53 / 55) 
0.98 
(49 / 50) 
0.9264, 1.0336 
 
Table 3 – Disclosure given return in previous period 
 
From the evidence presented in this sub-section, it can be concluded that subjects follow the 
sequential equilibrium strategies described in the disclosure regime. They do not follow the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium strategies. 
 
3.2 Sequential Equilibrium in the No-disclosure Regime – Defining ‘low’ investment as 
investment of 0 – 3 liras and ‘high’ investment as investment of 7 – 10 liras, 65.87%, 68.27% 
and 76.92% of investments in periods 1, 2 and 3 respectively are in the category of ‘high or low’ 
investments (Figure 5).  
 
                                                 
4
 This is average disclosure in period 2 given disclosure in period 1 and non-zero investment in period 1 and return 
in period 1. 
5
 This is average investment in period 3 given disclosure in period 1 and non-zero investment in period 1 and return 
in period 1 and disclosure in period 2 and non-zero investment in period 2 and return in period 2. 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
1
2
3
Investment Strategy 
Invest high or low Other
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Figure 5 – Investment strategy in no-disclosure regime 
 
Table 4
6
 shows the manager’s overall return probability (including trustworthy and 
untrustworthy managers). This overall return probability is estimated from data. In estimating the 
overall return probabilities, instances where a manager returned more than half of what the 
investor invested were included with instances where she returned exactly half and instances 
where a manager returned less than half were included with instances where she returned 
nothing
7
. Note that while in the disclosure regime, the cutoff used is half or more of what the 
manager received, in the no-disclosure regime, the cutoff used is half or more of what the 
investor invested. This is because in the no-disclosure regime, an untrustworthy manager can 
return the minimum amount consistent with her being the trustworthy type while in the 
disclosure regime such return behavior is disciplined by the presence of an accounting disclosure 
system. 
 
 
Observed return frequency, from data 
(2) 
Observed return frequency, excluding Set 1 
(3) 
Period 
1 
0.8607 
(173 / 201) 
0.8674*  
(157 / 181) 
Period 
2 
0.9353 
(159 / 170) 
0.9416 
 (145 / 154) 
Period 
3 
0.5 
(74 / 148) 
0.5 
(67 / 134) 
 
Table 4 – Return probabilities 
 
                                                 
6
 There are no instances in the data where investment did not occur in period t but occurred in period (t+1) or 
period(s) subsequent to (t+1). 
7
 In the experiment, a manager was allowed to return only in whole liras. This led to instances where a manager 
could not return to an investor exactly half of what the investor invested. Consequently, in moving from the model 
to the data, the cutoff of half or more of what the investor invested was replaced by a cutoff of 0.4 or more of what 
the investor invested. 
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The manager’s overall return probability (including trustworthy and untrustworthy managers) in 
period 1 is 0.8674 (Table 4). Since there are some instances of zero return, it must be that mixed 
strategy play by an untrustworthy manager begins in period 1.  Now, the investor sees the 
manager’s return for period 1 and updates her belief about the manager’s trustworthiness. Since 
mixed strategy play by the manager has begun in period 1, it must be that the investor’s updated 
or posterior belief about the manager’s type is exactly equal to the threshold for period 2. The 
threshold for period 2 is 0.4444 (Figure 2). Using the overall return probability for period 1, the 
threshold for period 2 and the Bayesian updating formula, one can infer the prior probability at 
the beginning of period 1. This inferred prior probability is 0.3855. 
 
From the evidence presented so far in this sub-section, it can be concluded that subjects follow 
the sequential equilibrium strategies described in the no-disclosure regime. They do not follow 
the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium strategies. 
 
4. Evidence on Higher Investment in Disclosure Hypothesis 
Average investment in the disclosure regime turns out to be lower than average investment in the 
no-disclosure regime in each of the three periods (Tables 1A and 1B). Table 5 reports the 
repeated-measures ANOVA for the effect the option to disclose (which is available only in the 
disclosure regime) has on total investment (m1 + m2 + m3). It reiterates the significant difference 
between investment in the disclosure regime and investment in the no-disclosure regime. 
 
Prior Probability, inferred from threshold for period 2 and (*) = 0.3855 
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Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F 
Model 26431.06 73 362.07 15.9 0 
Option to disclose 2351.21 1 2351.21 103.28 0 
Subject | option to disclose 4404.03 37 119.03 5.23 0 
Group | option to disclose 22321.71 35 637.76 28.02 0 
Residual 7261.99 319 22.76   
Total 33693.04 392 85.95   
 
Table 5 – ANOVA8 for the effect of option to disclose on total investment 
 
4.1 Differences in Priors as a Possible Explanation for Lower Investment in Disclosure – 
Lower investment is disclosure is a startling result. It seems attributable to the differences in 
prior beliefs across the two regimes. The prior probability with which an investor in the 
disclosure regime believes that a manager is trustworthy is lower than the prior probability with 
which an investor in the no-disclosure regime believes that a manager is trustworthy. This prior 
probability in the disclosure regime is 0.2951, whereas this prior probability in the no-disclosure 
regime is 0.3855 (Tables 2 and 4). 
 
Further, 17 managers in period 3 of the disclosure regime were trustworthy (Table 6A), whereas 
74 managers in period 3 of the no-disclosure regime were trustworthy (Table 6B). This implies 
that in the disclosure regime, at least 9.19 percent (17/185) of the initial sample of 185 
observations was composed of trustworthy managers (Table 6A), whereas in the no-disclosure 
regime, at least 35.58 percent (74/208) of the initial sample of 208 observations was composed 
of trustworthy managers (Table 6B).  
 
 
                                                 
8
In Tables 5A – 5C and Tables 8A – 8C, I have treated Group as the repeated. Alternatively it is possible to treat 
Subject as the repeated variable – it will lead to qualitatively similar results. 
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 All sets Excluding 
Set 1 
Number of observations 185 166 
Number of observations where disclosure occurred in period 1 (1) 149 135 
Number of observations from (1) where nonzero investments occurred 
in period 1 (2) 
141 128 
Number of observations from (2) where manager returned half or more 
of what she received in period 1 (3) 
91 85 
Number of observations from (3) with disclosure in period 2 (4) 78 72 
Number of observations from (4) where nonzero investments occurred 
in period 2 (5) 
77 72 
Number of observations from (5) where manager returned half or more 
of what she received in period 2 (6) 
55 50 
Number of observations from (6) with disclosure in period 3 (7) 53 49 
Number of observations from (7) where nonzero investments occurred 
in period 3 (8) 
50 46 
Number of observations from (8) where manager returned half of what 
she received in period 3 (9) 
17 16 
Proportion of trustworthy types in the original sample is at least  9.19% 
(17/185) 
9.64% 
(16/166) 
 
Table 6A – Summarizing the data collected for the disclosure regime 
 
 All sets Excluding 
Set 1 
Number of observations (1) 208 188 
Number of observations from (1) where nonzero investments 
occurred in period 1 (2) 
201 181 
Number of observations from (2) where manager returned an amount 
consistent with her being the trustworthy type in period 1 (3) 
173 157 
Number of observations from (3) where nonzero investments 
occurred in period 2 (4) 
170 154 
Number of observations from (4) where manager returned an amount 
consistent with her being the trustworthy type in period 2 (5) 
159 145 
Number of observations from (5) where nonzero investments 
occurred in period 3 (6) 
148 134 
Number of observations from (6) where manager returned half of 
what she received in period 3 (7) 
74 67 
Proportion of trustworthy types in the original sample is at least  35.58% 
(74/208) 
35.64% 
(67/188) 
 
Table 6B – Summarizing the data collected for the no-disclosure regime 
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The subject samples for both the disclosure and the no-disclosure regimes are drawn from the 
same population, and it is very intriguing that the prior beliefs across the samples are different. It 
may also be that the disclosure regime induces a lower prior belief than the no-disclosure regime. 
Though the question of why the disclosure regime induces a lower prior belief is in and of itself 
interesting, the next section introduces an experimental design to homogenize prior beliefs across 
the disclosure and no-disclosure regime samples. Because the prediction of higher investment in 
the disclosure regime is for a case of equal prior beliefs, such homogenization will enable a test 
of the prediction. 
 
4.2 Screening Round – A two-stage design was introduced to ensure that prior beliefs across the 
disclosure and no-disclosure samples were equal. The first stage was called the screening round 
and enabled the classification of managers into trustworthy and untrustworthy types. Then, a 
predetermined proportion of trustworthy and untrustworthy managers proceeded to the second 
stage, called the main round. This proportion was announced to the subjects who proceeded to 
the main round to give them an anchor point for forming their beliefs. The main round comprised 
either the disclosure regime or the no-disclosure regime. Common anchor points for subjects 
participating in the post-screening disclosure regime and the post-screening no-disclosure regime 
ensured that prior beliefs in the two post-screening regimes were equal. The screening round 
comprised a simplified version of the one-shot investment game. This simplified version is 
derived from McCabe and Smith (2000) and is graphed in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 – Screening round. 
 
An experimenter read aloud the instructions for the screening round (attached in Appendix B) to 
the subjects, while the subjects followed along on their own copies of the instructions. The 
subjects were recruited for three hours. Therefore, after reading the instructions for the screening 
round, they had the potential to be able to guess that there was something more to follow. Such 
guessing could alter their behavior in the screening round. To preempt this, the instructions said, 
“After everyone finishes this game on the computer, all of you will proceed to another session.” 
Now, creating a required mix of managers meant that not all subjects who participated in the 
screening round could go to the main round. Therefore the subjects who did not go to the 
computerized main round filled out a questionnaire for $10. 
 
I ran 2 sessions – the main round comprised the disclosure regime in the first session and it 
comprised the no-disclosure regime in the second session. Twenty-six subjects participated in the 
screening round of the first session. Of these, 13 were assigned to the role of an investor and 13 
were assigned to the role of a manager. The roles and the game were explained to the players 
Do Not Return Return 
Send Do Not Send 
Manager 
Investor 
10, 0 
15, 15 0, 30 
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using neutral terminology (e.g. A-player for investor and B-player for manager). Of the 13 
investors, 2 did not invest and consequently, the 2 managers they were respectively paired with 
could not be categorized into trustworthy or untrustworthy. Of the remaining 11 managers, 8 
returned and were classified as trustworthy while 3 did not return and were classified as 
untrustworthy. Thirty subjects participated in the screening round of the second session – 15 
were assigned to the role of an investor and 15 were assigned to the role of a manager. Of the 15 
investors, 5 did not invest leaving only 10 managers in the game. Of these 10 managers, 7 
returned and were classified as trustworthy while 3 did not return and were classified as 
untrustworthy. 
 
In each of the two sessions, 3 untrustworthy managers and 1 trustworthy manager were selected 
to go to the main round. This proportion was announced to the participants of the main round in 
the instructions for the main round (Appendix A). Further, in each session, any 4 of the subjects 
who played the role of an investor in the screening round were randomly selected to go the main 
round. Of these 8 subjects (4 investors and 4 managers) that proceeded to the main round in each 
session, those who were assigned the role of an investor in the screening round continued to play 
as an investor in the main round, and those who were assigned the role of a manager in the 
screening round continued to play as a manager in the main round. One investor was grouped 
with one manager, and the subjects in the group played against each other for three periods. At 
the end of three periods, each subject was grouped with some other subject. No two subjects 
were grouped twice (perfect stranger matching). Eight subjects in the main round and 
implementation of perfect stranger matching implies that there were 16 observations for each 
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experimental session. Descriptive statistics on investment and on average proportion returned in 
both the conditions are summarized in Tables 7A and 7B respectively. 
 
Amount Invested by Investor 
 
Proportion Returned by Manager 
Disclosure Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
 
Disclosure Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Mean 7.5 7.69 7.38 
 
Mean 0.4 0.35 0.11 
Median 7 7 7 
 
Median 0.41 0.38 0 
Std Dev 2 1.99 2.66 
 
Std Dev 0.15 0.2 0.15 
Min 4 5 2 
 
Min 0.08 0 0 
Max 10 10 10 
 
Max 0.67 0.7 0.4 
No-
disclosure 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
 
No-
disclosure 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Mean 4.38 5.19 3.75 
 
Mean 0.33 0.25 0.13 
Median 4 4 2.5 
 
Median 0.29 0.23 0 
Std Dev 3.46 3.62 3.64 
 
Std Dev 0.32 0.22 0.23 
Min 0 0 0 
 
Min 0 0 0 
Max 10 10 10 
 
Max 1 0.67 0.75 
 
Table 7A – Summary statistics for 
investment in post-screening disclosure and 
no-disclosure conditions 
 
Table 7B – Summary statistics for proportion 
returned in post-screening disclosure and no-
disclosure conditions 
  
Table 8 reports the repeated-measures ANOVA for the effect the option to disclose (which is 
available only in the disclosure regime) has on total investment (m1 + m2 + m3). The total 
investment is significantly higher in the disclosure regime, confirming hypothesis 3. 
 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F 
Model 1485.75 13 114.29 4.74 0.001 
Option to disclose 684.5 1 684.5 28.38 0.00 
Subject | option to disclose 188.88 6 31.48 1.31 0.3 
Group | option to disclose 612.38 6 102.06 4.23 0.01 
Residual 434.13 18 24.12   
Total 1919.88 31 61.93   
 
Table 8 – ANOVA for the effect of option to disclose on total investment in the post-screening 
sessions 
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The mimicking and end game behavior by untrustworthy managers in the post-screening 
disclosure and no-disclosure conditions is reported in tables 9A and 9B respectively. 
 
 All 
sets 
Number of observations 16 
Number of observations where disclosure occurred in period 1 (1) 7 
Number of observations from (1) where nonzero investments occurred in period 1 (2) 7 
Number of observations from (2) where manager returned half or more of what she 
received in period 1 (3) 
5 
Number of observations from (3) with disclosure in period 2 (4) 5 
Number of observations from (4) where nonzero investments occurred in period 2 (5) 5 
Number of observations from (5) where manager returned half or more of what she 
received in period 2 (6) 
4 
Number of observations from (6) with disclosure in period 3 (7) 2 
Number of observations from (7) where nonzero investments occurred in period 3 (8) 2 
Number of observations from (8) where manager returned half of what she received in 
period 3 (9) 
0 
Proportion of trustworthy types in the original sample is at least  0 
 
Table 9A – Summarizing the data collected for the post-screening disclosure regime 
 
 All 
sets 
Number of observations (1) 16 
Number of observations from (1) where nonzero investments occurred in period 1 (2) 14 
Number of observations from (2) where manager returned an amount consistent with 
her being the trustworthy type in period 1 (3) 
11 
Number of observations from (3) where nonzero investments occurred in period 2 (4) 10 
Number of observations from (4) where manager returned an amount consistent with 
her being the trustworthy type in period 2 (5) 
10 
Number of observations from (5) where nonzero investments occurred in period 3 (6) 8 
Number of observations from (6) where manager returned half of what she received in 
period 3 (7) 
2 
Proportion of trustworthy types in the original sample is at least  12.5% 
(2/16) 
 
Table 9B – Summarizing the data collected for the post-screening no-disclosure regime 
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4.3 Other Possible Explanations for Lower Investment in Disclosure – One possibility is that 
the actual disclosure per se, as against the option to disclose, has an effect on investment. In both 
set of experiments, average investment in each of the three periods is higher when actual 
disclosure occurred than the average investment respectively in each of the three periods when 
actual disclosure did not occur. However, in the first set of experiments, the average investment 
in each of the three periods when disclosure occurred in disclosure condition is still lower than 
the average investment respectively in each of the three periods in no-disclosure condition. And, 
in the second set of experiments, the average investment in each of the three periods when 
disclosure did not occur in disclosure condition is still higher than the average investment 
respectively in each of the three periods in no-disclosure condition.  
 
I ran the repeated-measures ANOVA for the effect the actual disclosure in period 1 of the 
disclosure regime has on the investment for that period in the first set and in the second set of 
experiments. While the actual disclosure does not have any significant effect on the investment 
in period 1 in the second set of experiments, it does have a significant effect on the investment in 
the first period of the first set of experiments. I ran the repeated-measures ANOVA for the effect 
the actual disclosure in periods 2 and 3 of the disclosure regime has on the investment for the 
respective periods in both the first set and the second set of experiments. Actual disclosure did 
not have a significant effect on investment in any of these. To fully tease out the effect of actual 
disclosure versus the effect of option to disclose will require future research. A possible research 
design involves collecting additional data for a regime where mandatory disclosure of 
information is required. Then, one can run a regression of investment on actual disclosure and on 
the option to disclose. 
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Another possibility is that the existence of an institution undermines trust. In this case, it is the 
existence of the institution of disclosure which per se undermines trust and might possibly be the 
key driving beliefs to be unequal. A related paper that suggests that knowledge of existence of 
institutions, including contracts, undermines trust is Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002. But there is 
no unanimity among academics that institutional structures undermine trust. For example, 
Coletti, Sedatole and Towry (2005) show that a strong institutional structure can actually 
engender trust. Future research will be needed to address the issue of whether disclosure 
undermines trust in an investment / trust game. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper illustrates the potential for the construct of voluntary disclosure to promote reputation 
building and welfare-increasing investment in an exchange with private information. Reputation 
building occurs differently in a regime where disclosure of private information is a possibility 
(disclosure regime) as compared to one where such disclosure is not a possibility (no-disclosure 
regime). Without disclosure, a dividend is the only tool available for reputation building. There 
is no way to identify untrustworthy behavior with certainty, so the value of benevolent behavior 
is diminished. In contrast, disclosure allows honest versus dishonest behavior to be 
distinguished, thereby making benevolent behavior more valuable. This differential reputation 
building is confirmed by experimental data, thereby establishing the model as a good predictor of 
behavior. Controlling for heterogeneous beliefs about player trustworthiness, I also find that the 
opportunity to make truthful voluntary disclosure raises the level of investment, improving the 
overall welfare of both parties. 
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While shedding light on the role of disclosure in trust environments, this paper also makes some 
methodological contributions. Existing research on accounting institutions uses accounting 
history to motivate hypotheses which are then tested experimentally. This study introduces a 
theoretical perspective in analyzing the role of accounting institutions. The use of the simplified 
version of one-shot investment game for a screening round is a contribution to experimental 
methodology.  
 
There are several interesting extensions possible to the setting examined in this paper. One 
possibility is to define a regime with mandatory disclosure and then compare the effect of 
mandatory versus voluntary disclosure regimes on trust, reputation and investment. Another 
possibility is to introduce a multiplier of zero in the set of possible multipliers and examine the 
role of bankruptcy in trust settings. It is possible to introduce reinvestment of the ‘income of the 
firm’ in this setting. The reinvestment will allow definition of balance sheets and thus, an 
examination of the differential role of income statements and balance sheets in building trust in 
economic exchange. Given that Historical Cost Accounting is income statement driven while 
Fair Value Accounting is balance sheet driven, such an examination could potentially shed light 
on the differential role these two accounting regimes play in facilitating trust and stimulating 
investment in an economy.  
 
The focus of this paper is the reputation building role of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, this 
paper has abstracted away from the possibility of differences in managerial talent and the 
possibility of a disclosure decision after a manager sees her private information. However, 
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disclosure has been argued to be a managerial talent signaling device and an unanswered 
question for future research then is the role reputation building may play where managers have 
different abilities in that a better manager has a higher probability of obtaining a higher 
multiplier. Further, letting a manager make a disclosure decision after she sees her private 
information will allow examining how the information content of disclosure interacts with 
strategic reputation building in trust settings. 
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Appendix A: Instructions for Main Round 
 
 
Instructions 
Introduction 
You have been invited to participate in a decision making experiment.  This experiment will last 
approximately two hours. During today’s session, you will earn income in an experimental 
currency called Lira.  At the end of the session, this currency will be converted to dollars at a rate 
of $0.08 (8 cents) per Lira, and you will be paid in cash. In addition to this income, you will also 
receive a show-up fee of $10. 
 
Please read these instructions very carefully.  You will be required to complete a quiz, in order to 
demonstrate that you have a complete and accurate understanding of these instructions.  After 
you have completed the quiz, the administrator will check your answers and discuss with you 
any questions that have been answered incorrectly.  
 
You are free to withdraw from the experiment at any time, for any reason.  If you choose to do 
so, please raise your hand.  In this case, you will be paid your $10 show-up fee as you leave. 
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Session Overview 
This session will be run entirely over the computer.  Please do not talk with any of the other 
participants.  If you have a question, you may raise your hand, and the administrator will answer 
the question privately.   
   
Roles and Procedures 
Every participant will be assigned to the role of either an A-player or a B-player. Once assigned, 
your role will remain unchanged during this session. Note that if you were assigned the role of an 
A-player in the previous game, you will be an A-player in this session, too and similarly, if you 
were assigned the role of a B-player in the previous game, you will be a B-player in this session, 
too. Also, of every 4 B-players playing this session, 1 B-player returned to the A-player while 3 
B-players did not return to the A-player in the previous game. Now, you will know your own 
role, but you will not know the role of any other participant. You will play several sequences of 3 
periods each. In the beginning of every 3-period sequence an A-player and a B-player will be 
grouped for that sequence. No 2 participants will be grouped twice. 
 
Each period proceeds through four stages. The 4 stages are briefly described in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1 
 
Stage 1 – B-Players’ Disclosure Decisions 
In Stage 1, B-player will have the choice of deciding whether s/he wants to let the A-player 
know the multiplied amount s/he will receive from A. B-player will see the following screen: 
 
Outline of the Stages in Each Period 
Stage 1 - B-player decides whether or not private information (multiplied amount) 
s/he will get in stage 3 will get revealed to A-player in Stage 4. 
 
Stage 2 - A-player sees the decision made by B-player and receives an endowment 
of 10 liras (experimental currency unit). A-player then decides how many of the 
10 liras to send to B-player. 
 
Stage 3 - The amount sent by the A-player is multiplied. This multiplied amount is 
received by the B-player. B-player then decides how much of the multiplied 
amount to return to A-player and how much to keep for himself / herself. 
 
Stage 4 - A and B-players are told their payoffs and relevant information. 
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Screen 1 
 
B-player may click either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. 
 
Stage 2 – A-Players’ Decisions 
A-player sees the decision made in Stage 1 by the B-player s/he is paired with. A-player also 
receives an endowment of 10 Liras. In the second stage, A-player will be prompted by the 
computer to decide how much of the initial endowment to keep and how much to send to a 
paired B-player. The amount sent will always be in whole Lira. The A-player will keep any 
money s/he has not sent to B-player. 
 
A-player will see the following screen: 
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Screen 2 
Stage 3 – B-Players’ Decisions 
The amount sent by the A-player is multiplied by 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 (referred to as ‘the 
multiplier’) before the B-player receives it. B-player will see the following screen (namely, 
Screen 3). Please note that every multiplier is equally likely to occur. 
 
 
Screen 3 
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B-player decides how much of the total amount to return to A-player. The amount returned will 
always be in whole Lira. B-player will keep the amount s/he does not send back to A-player. 
 
The B-player’s Stage 3 decisions will be entered on Screen 3, pictured above.  
 
Stage 4 - Disclosure and Payoffs 
In each period, A-player’s payoff will be the sum of the amount that s/he did not send to B-
player and the amount returned by B-player. In each period, B-player’s payoff will be the 
amount that s/he received minus the amount s/he returned to A-player. 
 
Following each period, A-player will receive the information presented on Screen 4, pictured 
below. Note that A-player will learn the amount B-player received only if B-player has elected to 
let the A-player know this amount. 
 
 
Screen 4 
 
Following each period, B-player will receive the information presented on Screen 5, pictured 
below. 
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Screen 5 
 
Completion of Periods 
After completing each period, the computer will proceed to the next period, which will be 
conducted identically to the previous period. After every 3 periods, every A-player will be 
grouped with a different B-player and every B-player will be grouped with a different A-player. 
You will not be grouped with the same participant twice. 
 
Once all periods have been completed, you will be paid your cumulative income. 
 
Please answer the questions that appear on your screen. You will be paid 50 cents for every 
correct answer. The experiment will begin after all the participants have answered all the 
questions.  
 
The following questions appeared on subjects’ screen. Answers are provided next to the 
questions. 
 
1. How many B-players will each A-player be grouped with in each sequence of 3 
periods? 1 B-player 
 
2. How many liras will an A-player be endowed with in Stage 2 of each period? 10 liras 
 
3. No two participants will be grouped more than once (True / False). True 
 
4. Will the amount sent by an A-player to a B-player be multiplied en route before it 
reaches the B-player (Yes / No)? Yes 
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5. Suppose A-player sent 1 lira. What are the possible amounts B-player may receive? 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5 
 
6. Is each multiplier equally likely in each round? Yes  
 
7. Suppose in a period A-player sent to B-player 6 liras and then received from B 10 liras. 
What will be player A-player’s profit from the pairing with B? 
 Amount retained by A + Amount returned by B = 4 + 10 = 14 liras 
 
8. Suppose in a period A-player sent 3 liras to B-player. B-player received 9 liras and sent 
back 2 liras to A-player. What will be B-player’s profit from pairing with A?  
Amount received by B – Amount returned by B = 9 – 2 = 7 liras 
 
Appendix B: Instructions for Screening Round 
 
Instructions 
Introduction 
You have been invited to participate in a decision making experiment.  I will read these 
instructions out loud. Please do not talk among yourselves. If you have any questions, please 
raise your hand. I will then answer your questions individually.   
 
During today’s session, you will earn income in an experimental currency called Lira.  At the 
end of the session, this currency will be converted to dollars at a rate of $1 per Lira, and you will 
be paid in cash. In addition to this income, you will also receive a show-up fee of $10. You are 
free to withdraw from the experiment at any time, for any reason.  If you choose to do so, please 
raise your hand.  In this case, you will be paid your $10 show-up fee as you leave. 
 
Session Overview 
Every participant will be assigned to the role of either an A-player or a B-player. Every A-player 
will be endowed with 10 liras. A-player can choose to send his / her endowment to a paired B-
player. If the A-player chooses not to send the endowment, then the game ends here – B-player 
receives nothing from A and A-player keeps her / his endowment of 10 liras. If A-player chooses 
to send her / his endowment to the B-player, then the endowment is tripled before it reaches the 
B-player. That is, the B-player receives 30 liras.  
 
If the B-player receives 30 liras from A-player, s/he can choose to return to the A-player. If B-
player chooses to return, then A-player receives 15 liras and B-player keeps 15 liras. If B-player 
chooses not to return, then A-player receives nothing and B-player keeps 30 liras. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the game. 
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Figure 1 
 
After everyone finishes this game on the computer, all will proceed to another session. 
 
 
Do Not Return Return 
Send Do Not Send 
B 
A 
10, 0 
15, 15 0, 30 
Note: The first figure is A’s payoff while the second 
figure is B’s payoff. 
